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INTRODUCTION 
Barry Kamins∗ 
The federal exclusionary rule, which is approaching its 100th anniver-
sary,1 was extended to the states almost fifty years ago by the Supreme 
Court in its landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio.2  It has thus defined the 
legal landscape for the entire career of virtually everyone who practices in 
a criminal courtroom today. 
Numerous decisions have refined the scope of the exclusionary rule and 
recently the Supreme Court, in Hudson v. Michigan3 and Herring v. United 
States,4 limited its application in ways that have led some commentators to 
predict its demise.  Whether or not that prediction is warranted, these deci-
sions nevertheless provide an opportunity to reflect on the future of the ex-
clusionary rule and to envision a world without it, even if that is a world 
many of us would regret. 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in Hudson, notably stated that “the 
continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our 
precedents, is not in doubt.”5  But surely Hudson changes the operation of 
the rule to the extent that its holding—a knock-and-announce violation by 
the police will not result in the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a 
valid warrant—limits suppression even in cases in which evidence derives 
from intentional, unconstitutional police misconduct, which is the very be-
havior that the exclusionary rule was designed to address. 
Perhaps the seeming incongruity of this result stems from two compet-
ing views of the exclusionary rule that have developed in the jurisprudence.  
 
∗ Administrative Judge for Criminal Matters, Second Judicial District.  Judge Kamins is the 
author of “New York Search and Seizure” (Lexis/Nexis/Matthew Bender).  The author 
wishes to thank his Principal Court Attorney, John T. Hecht, for his assistance in the prepa-
ration of this Introduction. 
 1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 2. 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961). 
 3. 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). 
 4. 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009). 
 5. 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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There is, first, a “majestic conception”6 of the rule that originates in Boyd v. 
United States7 and Weeks v. United States.8 
In Boyd, the Court wrote, “It is not the breaking of his doors, and the 
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it 
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liber-
ty and private property . . . .”9 
And in Weeks, the Court established a procedure, which ultimately be-
came the suppression hearing, allowing a defendant to seek the return of 
items that had been illegally seized, thus rendering them unavailable to the 
prosecution at his or her trial: 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to ob-
tain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, 
the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted 
practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should 
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all 
times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all con-
ditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental 
rights.10 
The view expressed in these decisions is concerned with preserving the 
integrity of the process by which convictions are obtained.  It has been re-
ferred to as the “imperative of judicial integrity.”11 
But a more ends-oriented approach—the one favored by the Court in 
Hudson and Herring—applies the exclusionary rule only where it “result[s] 
in appreciable deterrence. . . .  [W]e have focused on the efficacy of the 
rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.”12  In other 
words, “the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.”13 
This more pragmatic approach applies the exclusionary rule only where 
it is necessary to deter police misconduct.  Rather than finding that the in-
tegrity of the judicial process requires the rule’s application in all cases in 
which the police have violated the Fourth Amendment, the ends-oriented 
approach is limited to flagrant misconduct of law enforcement.  Thus, ac-
cording to this view, Weeks is not so much about the integrity of the judi-
 
 6. 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 7. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 9. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 10. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
 11. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). 
 12. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 13. Id. 
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cial process as deterrence of police misconduct: “Not only did [the officers] 
have no search warrant, . . . but they could not have gotten one had they 
tried.”14 
This is therefore the view of the exclusionary rule that the Court in Her-
ring expresses: “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and suffi-
ciently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
system.”15 
A brief survey of the history of the exclusionary rule may help to under-
stand how the Supreme Court has arrived at its current jurisprudence.  As 
we will see, this history reflects a tension between viewing the rule, on the 
one hand, as upholding the Bill of Rights and the integrity of the Court’s 
processes16 and, on the other, as punishing law-enforcement misconduct. 
Mapp v. Ohio, for example, cited both the “majestic” view of the exclu-
sionary rule and the more pragmatic deterrent rationale.  With regard to the 
former, it stated: 
Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enfor-
ceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as 
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as 
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal 
searches and seizures would be a form of words, valueless and undeserv-
ing of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so 
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would 
be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the 
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this 
Court’s high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liber-
ty.17 
The Court went so far as to call “the exclusion doctrine—an essential 
part of the right to privacy,”18 and warned that, “The ignoble shortcut to 
conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of con-
stitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.”19 
 
 14. Id. at 702. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“A ruling admitting evidence in a 
criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which pro-
duced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitution-
al imprimatur.”). 
 17. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. Id. at 656. 
 19. Id. at 660. 
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Yet the Mapp decision also acknowledged that the rule is borne out of 
necessity.  It recognized “[t]he obvious futility of relegating the Fourth 
Amendment to the protection of other remedies”20 and that “[t]o hold oth-
erwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and en-
joyment.”21  In other words, pragmatically speaking, because there was a 
right, a remedy was needed. 
The Court again recognized these inherent tensions in the rule in Stone v. 
Powell, where it considered whether to allow habeas petitioners to relitigate 
their Fourth Amendment claims in federal court if they had had the oppor-
tunity to litigate them in state court: 
While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the inte-
grity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.  The force of this jus-
tification becomes minimal where federal habeas corpus relief is sought 
by a prisoner who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at trial and on direct 
review.  The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the de-
terrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.22 
Soon after, in Franks v. Delaware,23 the Court again recognized a limita-
tion on the exclusionary rule.  In Franks, although the Court allowed a de-
fendant to challenge the veracity of the affidavit underlying the search war-
rant, it limited suppression to those cases in which the warrant depended on 
perjured or recklessly false statements in the affidavit.24  Accordingly—and 
the Herring Court would later find this significant—Franks allowed sup-
pression of the fruits of an unlawful search only if police misconduct was 
intentional or reckless and not merely negligent. 
In United States v. Leon,25 the Court again limited the exclusionary rule 
in the search warrant context, removing from its reach the fruits of a war-
rant that had been executed by officers who reasonably relied on it, even 
though, as it subsequently turned out, the warrant was not grounded in 
probable cause.26  The Court reasoned that applying exclusion in such a 
case would not “have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or 
magistrate,”27 whose error rendered the search unlawful.  In so concluding, 
 
 20. Id. at 652. 
 21. Id. at 656. 
 22. 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
 23. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
 24. Id. at 155-56. 
 25. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 900, 922. 
 27. Id. at 916. 
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the Court emphasized that the “officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s proba-
ble-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he 
issues must be objectively reasonable . . . and it is clear that in some cir-
cumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that 
the warrant was properly issued.28  Accordingly, “[i]n the absence of an al-
legation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, sup-
pression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in 
preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasona-
ble belief in the existence of probable cause.”29 
Then, foreshadowing Herring, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Evans 
upheld a search conducted by officers who relied on a police record that er-
roneously indicated the existence of a warrant.30  The Court reasoned that 
because the error was ultimately the court’s, on whose records the police 
had relied, police deterrence would not be furthered by exclusion of the 
evidence so obtained. 
The concurrence in Evans acknowledged a possible limitation on police 
reliance on court records: 
While the police were innocent of the court employee’s mistake, they may 
or may not have acted reasonably in their reliance on the recordkeeping 
system itself.  Surely it would not be reasonable for the police to rely, say, 
on a recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency’s, that has no 
mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely leads to 
false arrests, even years after the probable cause for any such arrest has 
ceased to exist (if it ever existed).31 
Against this background,32 the Court in Hudson and Herring was pre-
sented with the questions, respectively, of whether a knock-and-announce 
violation and police negligence in maintaining records of outstanding war-
rants would trigger the exclusionary rule. 
 
 28. Id. at 922-23 (citation and footnote omitted). 
 29. Id. at 926.  The Court later applied the reasoning of Leon in Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 (1984), to validate as objectively reasonable a search based on a 
warrant that contained a judge’s clerical error, and in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 
(1987), to validate as objectively reasonable a warrantless administrative search based on a 
statute later declared to be unconstitutional. 
 30. 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995). 
 31. Id. at 16-17 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 
695, 709 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The risk of error stemming from these [elec-
tronic] databases is not slim.”). 
 32. The Court has also limited the application of the exclusionary rule outside the con-
text of a criminal trial.  See Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 
(1998) (parole hearings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (grand jury 
proceedings). 
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In Hudson, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to a knock-
and-announce violation where the police had otherwise acted properly in 
executing a warrant that suffered no defects.  In so deciding, the Court first 
asserted that the police officers’ error—failing to knock and announce their 
presence—was not a “but-for” cause of obtaining the evidence, which oth-
erwise would have been found when the warrant was executed.33  In other 
words, even if the police had knocked and announced their presence, the 
contraband would still have been seized; if not, the result did not violate the 
Constitution because the knock-and-announce requirement was not in-
tended to help someone dispose of contraband or prevent its seizure, but to 
prevent injury and property damage when police enter a residence unan-
nounced.34  In short, because the exclusionary rule protects against the un-
lawful seizure of evidence and the knock-and-announce rule does not, the 
rule did not apply to a knock-and-announce violation.35 
Second, the Court found that the social cost of applying the exclusionary 
rule to knock-and-announce violations would be too great.36  This cost in-
cluded an anticipated flood of alleged knock-and-announce violations, the 
determination of which would be hampered by courts’ inability to set mea-
ningful standards as to what constitutes a reasonable waiting period for the 
police before they can forcibly enter a location.37  Given this uncertainty, 
police would likely wait longer than necessary, thereby endangering them-
selves or losing valuable evidence.38  Such costs outweighed the minimal 
deterrent value of applying exclusion to knock-and-announce violations, 
especially because “the increasing[ly] professional[] . . . police forces” of 
today39 are already motivated to comply with knock-and-announce re-
quirements in order to avoid dangerous situations and the possibility of 
having to defend civil lawsuits, including suits brought under section 1983, 
which did not exist at the time of the Mapp decision.40 
Hudson therefore squarely embraces the deterrent rationale of the exclu-
sionary rule.  But at the same time, by characterizing knock-and-announce 
violations as falling outside core Fourth Amendment interests, Hudson 
does not really reject the view that the exclusionary rule is a necessary cor-
relation of the right to privacy. 
 
 33. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006). 
 34. Id. at 593-94. 
 35. Id. at 594. 
 36. Id. at 595. 
 37. Id. at 595. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 598. 
 40. Id. at 597-99. 
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In Herring, a police investigator in Coffee County, Alabama, was alerted 
to the defendant’s presence in town.  Looking for a reason to arrest him, 
but finding none, the investigator asked officers in adjoining Dale County 
whether the defendant had any outstanding warrants.  According to the 
Dale County police department, a felony arrest warrant was outstanding for 
the defendant, who was quickly arrested as a result.  Shortly after, the po-
lice discovered that the warrant had been recalled.  In fact, the warrant may 
even have issued in error, but records failed to reflect these facts undermin-
ing the basis of the arrest due to negligence by police record keepers.41 
In concluding that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the fruits of 
Herring’s concededly unlawful arrest, the Court ruled that “the error was 
the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.”42  The Court 
reasoned that the rule was intended to curb police misconduct, and not that 
of the court (which was implicated in the error), and more importantly that 
the rule had only been applied when police misconduct was intentional or 
at least reckless, not merely negligent.43  The negligent record keeping at 
issue was insufficiently culpable to justify application of the exclusionary 
rule, given the rule’s deterrence and cost/benefit rationales. 
Again the Court embraced a rule grounded in deterrence of police mis-
conduct as opposed to a rule that would seek to preserve the integrity of the 
judicial process no matter the cost, finding, as it had in Hudson, that mis-
conduct that falls below the type of flagrant misconduct that gave rise to 
the exclusionary rule does not sufficiently threaten Fourth Amendment val-
ues so as to warrant its application.  Further, again as in Hudson, the Court 
expansively applied an attenuation analysis to acknowledge the Fourth 
Amendment violation but limit the remedy. 
The authors of the articles that follow focus particularly on Hudson’s 
and Herring’s reliance on the rule as a deterrent to police misconduct. 
Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb, in “The Exclusionary Rule Redux—
Again”, examines the rule’s history and the fugal voices championing ei-
ther a rights-based or a deterrence-based approach to the rule.  Professor 
Weinreb takes us back to the jurisprudence of Justice Frankfurter and its 
resonances today, and discusses ways in which the Court’s recent decisions 
that limit the rule’s scope—and encourage predictions of its demise—may 
affect police behavior.  He writes, 
The Court’s repeated downplaying of the rule and unwillingness to apply 
it as a remedy for a concrete violation of rights has the effect of making 
 
 41. 129 S. Ct. at 698, 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 698. 
 43. Id. at 701-02. 
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the rights themselves seem less urgent and in some, probably considera-
ble, measure implicates the courts in their violation.  That, in turn, reduces 
the deterrent effect of the rule.44 
Particularly in light of Professor Weinreb’s warning, we may wish to 
consider a recently released report of the New York City Police Depart-
ment finding that in 2009, a record 575,000 people in New York City—
90% of whom were identified as black or Hispanic—were stopped by the 
police, of whom only 6% were arrested.45  In the words of the New York 
Times’s editors, if this practice continues, the police may “risk permanently 
alienating an entire generation of people in the very neighborhoods where 
trust in the law is most needed.”46  Thus, according to Professor Weinreb 
and these commentators, not only may erosion of the exclusionary rule af-
fect police behavior, it may also corrode public confidence in the law and 
its representatives in both law enforcement and the judiciary. 
Professor Todd E. Pettys takes a different view.  He looks at how the 
continuation of the exclusionary rule itself may harm public confidence in 
the judiciary.  He focuses on the exclusionary rule’s impact on the truth-
finding purpose of a jury trial and advances an argument based on moral 
philosophy.  The title of Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument Against 
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule refers to the Kantian imperative 
that people be treated as autonomous moral actors rather than instrumental-
ities of others.  Professor Pettys argues that the “deliberative autonomy” of 
jurors is infringed whenever evidence is excluded from their consideration, 
thus making them instrumentalities of a judge who desires a certain out-
come (deterrence of police misconduct) unrelated to the “truth” in a partic-
ular case.  He argues for abandoning the exclusionary rule and having Con-
gress replace it with legislation that would provide meaningful financial 
deterrence of police misconduct through punitive damages and attorney 
fees; in other words, Professor Pettys would let juries, rather than judges, 
decide how much a constitutional violation is worth. 
Professor Donald Dripps in The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: 
From “Still Preoccupied with 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence” proposes 
another alternative to the current exclusionary rule, which he calls a “vir-
tual deterrence” approach.  Rather than exclude evidence that has been 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, courts would only condition-
ally exclude evidence pending a showing by the police that concrete steps 
 
 44. Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Exclusionary Rule Redux—Again, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
873, 886 (2010). 
 45. Editorial, Lingering Questions About “Stop-and-Frisk”, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, 
at A26. 
 46. Id. 
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have been taken to deter future violations.  He comes to this proposal via a 
cost/benefit critique of the deterrence arguments of both the Hudson major-
ity and the Herring dissent.  Professor Dripps argues that the social cost of 
exclusion should not be attributed solely to the exclusionary rule but also to 
the Fourth Amendment itself, because even without the rule the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements result in the loss of 
evidence.  But not only does the Hudson majority therefore overstate the 
exclusionary rule’s “substantial social costs,” so too does the Herring dis-
sent overstate the extent to which these decisions encourage lawless beha-
vior.  He suggests that his “virtual deterrence rule” would achieve deter-
rence more effectively than the present rule and would offer judges 
something more palatable than the current rule, which, he asserts, some-
times results in judges’ crediting unworthy police testimony in order to 
avoid suppression. 
Professor Hadar Aviram, Jeremy Seymour, and Professor Richard Leo 
also address the deterrence rationale that underlies Herring and Hudson.  In 
Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in the Context of Frag-
mented Policing, they analyze Herring as an example of a crime-control 
model of judicial thinking, in which law enforcement efficiencies and the 
realities of daily police work primarily motivated the Court.  Those reali-
ties, however, bring to light the way in which contemporary law enforce-
ment agencies have evolved into fragmented, rather than coordinated, enti-
ties.  Herring’s allowing for police officer negligence, according to the 
authors, offers a potential for abuse by discouraging collaboration among 
agencies and incentivizing inefficiencies in recordkeeping. 
In Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Professor 
Erin E. Murphy takes up the thread of the argument that Herring encourag-
es police negligence by limiting the exclusionary rule.  She considers the 
history of databases and the way constitutional jurisprudence has evolved 
to deal with this relatively new source of information-gathering.  She ana-
lyzes cases from both inside and outside the criminal field that map the in-
tersection of privacy rights and law enforcement needs, and identifies the 
largely unexplored ways in which databases call for a new way of thinking 
about the government’s compilation and dissemination of information, 
even if that information is already public.  She concludes that the web of 
information that databases spin requires a more systemic approach than a 
jurisprudence focused only on individuals in discrete cases, particularly 
given the number of anonymous actors who contribute to databases and the 
often unregulated ways in which they do so. 
The concerns expressed by these authors and the two suggestions for al-
ternatives to the exclusionary rule continue the debate about the future of 
the rule.  They prompt additional questions: To what extent does the exclu-
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sionary rule affect prosecutors, and how would its absence affect their deci-
sions to prosecute and to plea bargain?  Similarly, how does the rule affect 
defense lawyers’ calculus of the worth of their cases?  What about judges?  
Has the rule contaminated judicial decisionmaking in the way Professor 
Dripps suggests?  If so, would judges feel free to address police misconduct 
more forthrightly and effectively if suppression were not typically required 
when they find a Fourth Amendment violation?  Can they craft jury in-
structions that would sufficiently remedy such a violation?  Would replac-
ing the rule with damage remedies work for those, like the poor, with pos-
sibly limited access to lawyers?  Does Herring’s requirement that a 
defendant show gross negligence or recklessness in the police’s mainten-
ance of a database disproportionately affect poor defendants, who may not 
have the resources to challenge systemic police practices?  Or are institu-
tional indigent defenders in the best position to mount such challenges?  
Would state courts find in their constitutions, or would state legislatures 
impose, an exclusionary rule or a variety of exclusionary rules—or nothing 
at all—if the federal rule were further limited or abolished?  Can legisla-
tures (including Congress) reasonably be relied on to protect the rights of 
disfavored criminals? 
Certainly one may argue that Herring and Hudson make these questions, 
and others, more pressing than before.  But perhaps, as Justice Kennedy 
stated in his Hudson concurrence, the viability of the rule is not in doubt.  
These decisions, after all, were made in the context of search and arrest 
warrants, where judges—even if they may occasionally err—and not just 
police assure that Fourth Amendment protections are observed. 
